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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three distinct essays. The abstracts for each individual essay are
given below:
The Effect of Daily Start Times on Academic Performance
Local school districts often stagger daily start times for their schools in order to reduce busing
costs. This paper uses data on all middle school students in Wake County, NC from 1999-2006
to identify the causal effect of daily start times on academic performance. Using variation in start
times within schools over time, the effect is a two percentile point gain in math test scores and a
one and a half percentile point gain in reading test scores. The effect is stronger for students in the
lower end of the distribution of test scores, and is roughly similar to raising parent’s education by
one year. I find evidence supporting increased sleep, less time spent watching television and more
time spent on homework as mechanisms through which start times affect test scores.
Expectations of Future Subsidies and Educational Enrollment
This essay uses a regression discontinuity approach to evaluate the effect of Progresa, a con-
ditional cash transfer program in rural Mexico where mothers are given cash grants conditional
on their childrens school attendance. I identify separate effects for initial-treatment and delayed
treatment villages. In 1999, the year before eligible households in the delayed-treatment villages
began receiving transfer, Progressa eligibility increased secondary school enrollment by 5.0 per-
cent in delayed-treatment villages and 10.9 percent in initial-treatment villages.
ii
The Effect of College Type on Income
This essay measures the differential return to college type (as defined by the Carnegie Classi-
fications). Using data from the NLSY79, I find that graduates of traditional liberal arts colleges
have similar incomes to graduates of other types in the first ten years of their careers, but receive
a wage premium of up to twenty-five percent in later years. In contrast, graduates of professional
oriented bachelor’s colleges earn as much as twenty-nine percent less than other graduates through
out their careers, and Research I graduates receive a ten percent premium. Results are similar for
both regression models and propensity score matching methods.
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To Emily and Abigail: my love and my joy.
iv
Acknowledgments
This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. I owe a
great debt of gratitude to my advisor, Darren Lubotsky for his constant encouragement, profes-
sional guidance and many helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank my thesis committee members
Ron Laschever, Daniel McMillen, and Elizabeth Powers for many insightful comments. Further,
I also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Ina Stringfellow at the Wake County Public School
System Transportation Department in providing me with start time data, as well as the staff at the
North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics in facilitating my use of the restricted data used in this project.
Most importantly, I thank my wife Emily for her support throughout this project.
v
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 The Effect of Daily Start Times on Academic Performance . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Why Might Start Times be Important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Data and Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 The Relationship Between Start Time and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Why Do Start Times Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chapter 3 Expectations of Future Subsidies and Educational Enrollment . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Program and Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Chapter 4 The Effect of College Type on Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4 Matching Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Education plays a critical role in the modern economy. Higher levels of education result in higher
wages for individuals (Card, 1999), and average years of schooling is positively correlated with
growth among nations (Barro, 2001). Recent results estimate human capital to be approximately
three-quarters of all wealth (di Giovanni and Matsumoto, 2011). The importance of education has
led to increased attention by economists. Modern economic analysis of education has expanded
greatly since the development of human capital theory nearly fifty years ago. In addition to exam-
ining how additional years of schooling relate to earnings, economists have sought to understand,
among other topics, the effect of education on non-pecuniary outcomes, how social returns to ed-
ucation compare to private returns, the effect of educational systems on growth, and the role of
inputs in education production functions. This dissertation contains three distinct essays, which
each offer different perspectives on the way in which different factors influence the efficacy of
education.
The first essay, The Effect of Daily Start Times on Academic Performance, presents an analysis
of how daily start times affects the performance of students on end-of-year standardized tests, using
data on all middle school students in Wake County, NC from 1999-2006. Exploiting variation in
start times within schools over time, this essay finds that a one-hour later start time results in a
two percentile point increase in math test scores, and a one percentile point increase in reading
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test scores. The effect increases with age, with fourteen year olds experiencing a four percentile
point increase from a one-hour later start time. Quantile regression results show that the effect is
large for students in the lower part of the distribution of test scores. This essay contributes to the
literature on education inputs. The magnitude of the increase in test scores from later start times
compares favorably to gains from other education policy changes, such as smaller class sizes. As a
point of comparison, in Krueger (1999), reducing class size by one third increases test scores by 4
percentile points in the first year. Later start times can also be more cost effective than other policy
changes. A one hour later start time would cost about $150 per student per year, compared to the
$2151 per student per year that Krueger calculates for reducing class size. I also provide evidence
for the mechanism through which start times work. Physiological evidence suggests that hormonal
changes may make it difficult for adolescent students to compensate for early start times with early
bed times. The results found in this essay are consistent with that explanation: start times have a
greater impact on older middle school students.
The second essay, Expectations of Future Subsidies and Educational Enrollment, uses a regres-
sion discontinuity approach to evaluate the effect of Progresa, a conditional cash transfer program
in rural Mexico where mothers are given cash grants conditional on their childrens’ school atten-
dance. Existing evaluations have used the random assignment of villages into initial treatment
(which began receiving transfers in 1998) and delayed treatment (which began receiving transfers
in 2000) groups. In contrast, this essay exploits the similarity of households just below and just
above the eligibility cutoff to identify the impact of Progressa. This strategy allows me to iden-
tify separate effects for initial-treatment and delayed treatment villages. In 1999, the year before
eligible households in the delayed-treatment villages began receiving transfers, Progressa eligibil-
ity increased secondary school enrollment by 5.0 percent in delayed-treatment villages and 10.9
percent in initial-treatment villages. This essay makes two main contributions. First, it provides
evidence of forward looking behavior on the part of poor households in rural Mexico. For eligible
households in delayed-treatment villages, eligibility for future transfers represents a decrease in
the long run cost of schooling. Inasmuch as these households are more likely to enroll their chil-
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dren in school the year before transfers begin, they demonstrate forward looking behavior. Second,
this essay demonstrates a potential weakness in the design of randomized controlled trials in the
social sciences. In cases where the treatment is designed to elicit a behavioral response and is to
be expanded to control households after an initial evaluation program, forward looking households
in the control group may modify their behavior in anticipation of future program benefits. This
change in behavior results in a corruption of the control group and can potentially bias the result-
ing estimates. As a result, it is crucial that expectations of future benefits, and resulting behavioral
responses be taken in to account when designing program evaluations.
The third essay, The Effect of College Type on Earnings, examines how the type of college (as
defined by the Carnegie classifications) from which an individual graduates effects earnings over
the course of a career, using both least squares regression and propensity score matching methods.
Although differences among elementary and secondary schools have been examined on a variety
of dimensions (such as class size, teacher education and school start time), post secondary schools
have largely focused on a single factor - quality, which is measured by selectivity or test scores of
incoming students. Instead of focusing on quality, this essay uses the Carnegie foundation clas-
sifications as a proxy for differences between schools. Using longitudinal data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, I find that Research I and Baccalaureate I graduates both earn
a wage premium relative to Master’s I schools. The premium is relatively constant over the career
for Research I graduates - roughly 10 percent. Baccalaureate I graduates do not receive a premium
in the initial years after graduation but earn a twenty-five percent premium with twenty-one to
twenty-five years of experience. This result demonstrates that ”quality” alone does not capture all
relevant differences between post-secondary schools. Both Research I and Baccalaureate I schools
would generally be classified as high quality, but the wage premium paid to their graduates follows
different patterns over the course of a career. This result demonstrates the need to consider other
factors in addition to quality in the analysis of post-secondary education.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Daily Start Times on
Academic Performance
2.1 Introduction
What time should the school day begin? There is considerable variation in daily start times both
across the nation and within individual communities, with schools beginning as early as 7:30 a.m.
or as late as 9:00 a.m.1 The issue of timing is by no means trivial. Districts stagger the start times of
different schools in order to reduce the number of buses used and thus reduce transportation costs.
However, if beginning the school day early in the morning has a negative impact on academic
performance, staggering start times may not be justified on a cost-benefit basis.
In recent years, school start times have received considerable attention in the popular press (see,
for example, Kalish (2008) and Trudeau (2007)). Proponents of later start times argue that students
in early starting schools do not receive enough sleep and that performance can be increased by
beginning the school day at a later time. Several school districts have responded by delaying the
start of their school day, and a 2005 congressional resolution (H. Con. Res. 200) was introduced
by Rep. Zoe Lofgren, recommending that all secondary schools start at 9:00 or later nationwide.
1Throughout this paper, all times are a.m., unless otherwise indicated.
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Despite this attention, the relationship between start times and academic performance is not well
understood.
This paper uses data on all middle school students in Wake County, North Carolina from 1999-
2006 to examines how start times affect the performance of middle school students (grades 6-8)
on standardized tests. Wake County is uniquely suited for this purpose because it has considerable
variation in start times across schools within a single large school district, as well as variation in
start times within schools over time. The differences in start time across schools are a result of
bus scheduling concerns, while the differences within schools are driven by population growth.
Using both sources of variation in start times, I find that a one hour delay in start time increases
standardized test scores on both math and reading test by three percentile points. Since start times
may be correlated with other characteristics that determine of test scores, I also estimate the effect
using only variation in start times within the same schools over time and find a two percentile
point improvement in math and a one percentile point improvement in reading. The effect of start
times on academic performance is robust to different specifications and sources of variation, and is
stronger for the lower end of the distribution of start times. The magnitude of the effect is similar to
the difference in test scores for one additional year of parental education. The impact of later start
times on test scores is persistent. Conditional on a high school fixed effect, a one hour later start
time in grade eight is associated with an increase in test scores in grade ten similar in magnitude
to the increase in grade eight.
The unique data used in this paper allow me to examine several possible mechanisms through
which later start times might raise student performance. The rationale typically given for start
times affecting academic performance is primarily biological. Earlier start times may result in
fewer hours of sleep, since students may not fully compensate for earlier rising times with earlier
bed times. In particular, adolescents have difficulty adjusting to early bed times due to the timing
of the release of the hormone melatonin (Dahl and Lewin, 2002). A reduced amount of sleep has
been demonstrated to reduce students’ cognitive ability (Meijer et al., 2000). This in turn could
reduce learning, resulting in lower test scores. I find evidence supporting this explanation: among
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middle school students, the impact of start times is greater for older students. However, I also
find evidence of other potential mechanisms as well. Students who begin school later have fewer
absences and spend more time on homework each week. These factors may also explain why
later-starting students have higher test scores.
2.2 Why Might Start Times be Important?
One reason that schools begin the school day at different times is the use of tiered busing systems.
Many school districts stagger the times their schools begin the school day so that the same bus and
driver can serve multiple schools. For example, a school district might start a high school at 7:30, a
middle school at 8:15 and an elementary school at 9:00. This has the potential to drastically reduce
transportation costs compared to an alternative schedule where all three schools start at 8:15.
Only one nationally representative dataset records school start times: The 2001 Before- and
After-School Programs and Activities section of the National Household Education Survey (ASPA-
NHES), conducted by the National Center for Educational Statistics. This dataset does not contain
any information on academic achievement, so it cannot be used to measure the impact of start
times on student performance. However, it is useful in establishing the variation of start times
across the nation and for comparing the data used in this paper to national norms. Table 2.1 lists
summary statistics for middle school start times for the national sample in 2001. Nationally, the
median middle school student begins school at 8:00. Over one fourth of students begin school at
8:30 or later, while more than 20 percent begin at 7:45 or earlier.
In addition to the national sample, Table 2.1 also lists statistics for middle school start times
in Wake County from 1999-2006. As would be expected when comparing a specific district to the
national distribution, start times in Wake County are more concentrated than they are nationwide.
In Wake County, 53.1 percent of middle school students start school at 7:30, and another 22.4
percent begin at 8:15. In comparison, only 26.7 percent of students start at the national modal time
of 8:00. More importantly, start times are consistently earlier in Wake County than nationwide: the
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median Wake County student begins school earlier than over 90 percent of students nationwide.
Since the marginal impact of start times on academic performance may decrease (or increase) for
later start times, care should be taken in imputing the conclusions reached in this paper to schools
that have a later start time. Put another way, the gain from later start times found here derive
largely from changes from 7:30 to 8:15. The same gains may not occur from changing start times
from 8:30 to 9:15, for example.
Table 2.1: Nationwide and Wake County Student Start Time Statistics
Percentiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Nationwide 7:35 7:55 8:00 8:30 8:45
Wake County, NC 7:30 7:30 7:30 8:15 8:15
S. Dev Percentage Sample
(Minutes) Mode at Mode Size
Nationwide 27.7 8:00 26.7% 4,568
Wake County, NC 20.4 7:30 53.1% 173,791
Students are in grade 6-8. Nationwide data comes from the ASPA-
NHES (2001). Wake County data is pooled data from 1999-2006.
Another source of information on nationwide start times is a survey of high school start times
by Wolfson and Carskadon (2005). They randomly selected 4,116 schools and asked them to
report start times retrospectively since 1965. While the survey deals with high schools instead of
middle school and has response problems (fewer than ten percent of schools selected are included
in their final sample), it does provide useful information about the types of schools that begin
early or late. They find that large schools (>1000 students) begin on average 15 minutes earlier
than small (<1000 students) schools, and that rural schools begin 15 minutes later than urban or
suburban schools. Schools that are not part of a tiered busing system begin on average 15 minutes
later than schools with a two tiered system and 20 minutes later than schools using a three-tiered
system. Their findings are consistent with theWCPSS being an urban/suburban school district with
a three-tiered busing system and having somewhat earlier start times than the national sample.
There is credible evidence (Danner and Phillips, 2008; Baroni et al., 2004) that students who
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begin the school day earlier sleep less. To obtain the same amount of sleep as students who have a
later start time, early-starting students would need to go to sleep earlier. Activities such as sports,
work, family and social schedules may make it difficult for students to adjust the time they go to
bed. In addition, the onset of puberty brings two factors that can make this adjustment particularly
difficult for adolescents: an increase in the needed amount of sleep and a change in the natural
timing of the sleep cycle. Hormonal changes, in particular the secretion of melatonin, shift the
natural circadian rhythm of adolescents, making it increasingly difficult to fall asleep early in the
evening. It is well established in the physiological literature that less sleep is associated with a
decrease in cognitive performance, both in a laboratory settings and through self-reported sleep
habits (Pilcher and Huffcutt, 1996).2 Specific to academic achievement, numerous studies have
reported a negative correlation between self reported hours of sleep and grades among both middle
and high school students.3
Since students who start school earlier typically sleep less, and less sleep is associated with
decreased academic performance, one would expect that students in early-starting schools would
perform worse on standardized tests. However, there is little empirical evidence directly linking
school start times and academic performance. Allen (1992) and Wolfson et al. (2007) examine a
small number of schools and find a positive correlation between later start times and student grades.
This approach is inherently limited; any increase in performance could reflect other unobserved
factors rather than the impact of a later start time.
The study most widely cited in the popular press (Wahlstrom, 2000) examined two Minnesota
school districts (Minneapolis Public Schools and Edina) which changed the start times in their
secondary schools to start over an hour later.4 Wahlstrom is concerned with the impact of start
times on a wide range factors, including attendance, sleep behavior, school discipline and extra-
curricular activities, in addition to academic performance. The impact of a delayed start time is
2Laboratory studies tend to focus on large amounts of sleep loss. The amount of sleep lost from starting school
earlier would be much less. Laboratory results should be viewed as establishing a credible relationship between sleep
and cognitive performance.
3See Wolfson and Carskadon (2003) for a survey of these studies.
4Edina school district changed their start times from 7:25 to 8:30 and Minneapolis changed from 7:15 to 8:40.
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measured by comparing the mean grade obtained by high school students during the three years
prior to the start time change and mean grades from three years after the change. Wahlstrom finds a
positive but statistically insignificant increase in mean grades, but does not report the actual results.
Recent working papers by Hinrichs (2010), Carrell et al. (2010), and Wong (2011) avoid many
of the issues of extant studies. Hinrichs uses individual ACT data on students in the Minneapolis
metro area for the same policy change as Wahlstrom. However, he includes additional school
districts, allowing him to control for secular time trends. Hinrichs also uses school-level data on
Kansas assessment tests in the 10th and 11th grades. Using a variety of specifications, he finds no
effect of later start times in any of his specifications. Carrell et al. (2010) examine how the time
of the first class of the day affects college freshman. They use data from the United States Air
Force Academy, where freshman are randomly assigned to class periods.5 They find that a one
hour delay in the first class of the day increases grades by 0.15 standard deviations. Wong uses
cross sectional data and finds effects ranging from .02 to .08 standard deviations for a one hour
later start time, although his results generally lack statistical precision.
This paper complements existing studies in several ways. First, I am better able to control
for unobservable factors by using multiple sources of variation in start times, both across schools
and within schools over time. Second, I examine students in middle school (6th - 8th grades),
while existing studies tend to examine high school students, often in a single grade. If adolescent
hormones determine how start times affect academic performance, middle school students may
respond differently than high school students. Third, I use standardized test scores instead of letter
grades or grade point average. Fourth, I examine changes in start times that occurred in different
years for different schools, and are not intended to increase student achievement. This makes
Hawthorne effects6 unlikely and will allow me to separate out year effects. Lastly, my unique
data set allows me to examine several specific mechanisms through which start times may affect
5Some students have a first period class and others do not, but all students must attend mandatory breakfast prior
to the first class period.
6A Hawthorne effect occurs when subjects modify their behavior because they are being studied, and not because
of a change in an explanatory variable.
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academic performance, in particular whether the “adolescent hormone” hypothesis explains the
effect of start times on academic performance.
2.3 Data and Institutional Background
The data set used in this paper is combined from two sources. The first source is administrative
data for every student in North Carolina between 1999 and 2006.7 The data contain detailed
demographic variables for each student as well as end of grade test scores in both reading and
math.8 The raw test scores vary considerably by year, so I use the statewide data to construct
percentile scores for each student within their grade and the current year.9 The second source of
data is the start time for each school in the Wake County Public School System (WCPSS), by
year.10 Start times were matched to the school code for each student in the administrative data.
There are several factors that make these data well suited for examining the effect of start times
on academic performance. Examining a single school district avoids problems resulting from
correlation of start times with unobserved characteristics at the district level. Since start times are
generally determined at the district level, it may be that well-run districts tend to have earlier (or
later) start times, or they may be more (or less) likely to change the start times of their schools.
The WCPSS is also large enough to measure effects precisely. It has considerable variation in start
times both across schools and within schools over time. By focusing on middle school students, I
7The administrative data were provided by the North Carolina Education Research Center.
8The data also contain information on teachers, potentially allowing me to control for teacher and classroom
characteristics. However, I am unable to link students to the teacher data set for roughly 28% of my sample. In
addition, the teacher that is linked is the teacher who supervised the exam, which may not be the teacher the student
had for the school year. I construct a “class size” index which is the number of students coded with the same teacher,
class period, and year. For 15% of students matched to teachers, the “class size” was over 50. This suggests for
many students the teacher linked to their record was not their true teacher, but rather a supervisor of a test for multiple
classes. As a result, I do not include teacher or class characteristics in the results shown. Results are generally similar
when teacher characteristics are included.
9Specifically, I pool the raw test scores for all students in North Carolina in a given year and grade. I then assign
each student in Wake County a percentile rank based on where their raw test score falls in the statewide distribution.
Percentile scores were constructed seperately for math and reading. An alternate normalization would be to construct
Z-scores by subtracting the statewide mean and deviding by the statewide standard deviation. Results using Z-scores
are presented in table 2.7 and are very similar to those for percentile ranks.
10The start time data were provided by the WCPSS transportation department.
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am able to test the “adolescent hormones” hypothesis of why later start times affect test scores.
The WCPSS is the eighteenth largest public school district in the United States with 120,504
students (kindergarten through twelfth grade) in the 2005-06 school year. It encompasses all pub-
lic schools in Wake County, a mostly urban and suburban county that includes the cities of Raleigh
and Wake Forest. Start times for schools in the district are proposed by the transportation depart-
ment (which also determines bus schedules) and are approved by the school board. While the
school board could in theory make changes to the bell schedule, they did not do so during the
sample period of 1999-2006. The practice of combining school start times and bus scheduling is
supported by the Operations Research literature concerning the “school bus problem,” where it
is well established that costs can be reduced up to 30% if start times and bus routes are chosen
simultaneously (Keller and Muller, 1979; Fugenschuh, 2009).
Since 1995, WCPSS has operated under a three-tiered system. While there is some variation
in the exact start times, most Tier I schools begin at 7:30, Tier II schools at 8:15 and Tier III at
9:15. Tiers I and II are composed primarily of middle and high schools, and Tier III is composed
entirely of elementary schools. Figure 2.1 is a histogram of the distribution of start times of middle
schools for the pooled sample.11 Just over half of middle schools begin at 7:30, with substantial
numbers of schools beginning at 8:00 and 8:15 as well.
Wake County is divided into 1,134 student assignment nodes. Each node is associated with an
elementary, middle and high school that is the “base” school for all students living within the node.
Nodes are matched to schools based on facility utilization, distance and diversity. Each year, as
the population changes and new schools are built, a limited number of nodes are reassigned to new
schools. Nodes remain with a given school for a minimum of three years between reassignments.
A majority (72.5 % in 2006) of students attend their base school. Alternatively, students may
choose to apply to attend a magnet school.12 Magnet schools use a specialized curriculum and
11Most schools are represented seven times (once for each year) although sometimes with different start times.
12A small number (< 5%) of students transfer to a base school other than the one they are assigned. Such transfers
are only allowed for exceptional circumstances and for grandfathered students who live in a reassigned node. Bus
transportation is not provided for transfer students. I do not have information on which students have transfered to a
different base school than the one to which they are assigned.
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Figure 2.1: Histogram of Middle School Start Times
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Source: Author’s calculations from data provided by the WCPSS transportation department.
Figure includes all non-magnet middle schools in Wake County, NC from 1999-2006. Each
school appears once per school year.
12
typically have smaller enrollments. Magnet school admittance is determined by lottery.13 Bus
transportation is provided to students whether they attend the base school or a magnet school.
Since buses serving magnet school must cover a larger geographic area, ride times tend to be
longer for magnet school students. As a result, almost all magnet schools begin at the earliest start
time. For example in 2004, nine out of ten magnet schools began at 7:45 or earlier compared with
nine out of sixteen base schools. Students at magnet schools tend to have higher test scores, which
may cause a spurious negative relationship between start times and test scores. Furthermore, since
students can choose to apply to magnet schools, it is possible that they chose a magnet school
partially based on start time. For these reasons, I exclude magnet schools from my sample. Five
schools began a magnet program during the sample period. These schools are included in the
sample prior to becoming a magnet school and excluded after. Results including magnet schools
are presented in table 2.7.
Over the seven years examined in this paper, WCPSS grew from 20,530 students enrolled
in twenty-two middle schools during the 1999-2000 school year to 27,686 students enrolled in
twenty-eight middle schools in 2005-2006. In addition to population growth, the WCPSS in-
creased the number of magnet schools from five to thirteen by opening three new magnets schools
and converting five existing non-magnet schools into magnet schools. Three new non-magnet
schools were also opened.
As a result of population growth, the transportation department changed start times to accom-
modate new schools and increased enrollment at existing schools. Existing non-magnet schools
had their start times change fourteen times in the sample, with some schools starting earlier and
others later. In the portion of my analysis that uses school or student fixed effects, it is these
changes that identify the effect of later start times. Table 2.2 tabulates the changes in start times.
Each cell contains the number of schools that switched from the corresponding old start time to the
corresponding new start time. Four schools changed their start time twice. Those schools appear
twice in the table. Eleven schools did not change their start time in the sample period. Those
13Preference within the lottery is given to some students based on sibling enrollment, distance and diversity.
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Table 2.2: Changes in Start Times
New Start Time
7:30 7:35 7:45 8:00 8:05 8:15 8:25 8:45
7:30 8 - - 1 - 2 - -
7:35 - - - - - 1 - -
Old 7:45 - - 1 - - - - -
Start 8:00 1 - - 1 - 4 1 -
Time 8:05 - - - - 1 - - -
8:15 2 - - - - - - -
8:25 - - - 1 - - - -
8.45 - - - - - 1 - -
Source: Author’s tabulation. Each cell contains the number of schools that
changed their start time from the given old start time to the new start time.
Schools on the diagonal had no change in start time.
schools appear in the diagonal cells and have the same old and new start time. There were a total
of fourteen changes in start times by nine schools. Seven of those changes were of thirty minutes
or more.
Table 2.3 lists means of selected demographic variables by start time for 2000 and for 2006.
Panel A includes student characteristics, while Panel B includes (unweighted) school character-
istics.14 For the purposes of tabulation, I separate start times into two groups: Tier I (7:30-7:45)
and Tier II (8:00-8:45). Buses that serve Tier I schools would have time to serve two additional
schools, but buses that serve Tier II schools would only have time for one more school. For almost
all of the student demographics, there are differences between earlier and later starting schools in
2000. The differences are generally small in magnitude, but precisely measured. For example,
24% of students in Tier I schools are black, compared to 21% of Tier II students. Students in ear-
lier starting schools are more likely to be female, belong to an ethnic minority, be eligible for free
lunches and have less educated parents. In 2006, the demographic characteristics of the two tiers
are generally closer together, but several differences still remain. Since the characteristics more
prevalent amoung Tier I students are generally believed to be associated with lower test scores, the
simple correlation between test scores is unlikely to represent a causal effect. Moreover, if students
14Tabulations for other years in the sample are similar to 2000 and 2006, but are not presented.
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in early-starting schools have other characteristics that are correlated with test scores, contolling
for the observed characterstics may not be sufficient to give an unbiased estimate of the effect of
start times.
The school characteristics in each tier are much more similar to each other than the student
characteristics are.15 In particular, schools in both tiers have similar enrollments and pupil to
teacher ratios. For none of the variables are the differences between the two tiers statistically
significant at conventional levels. Even for variables that are statistically different in panel A, the
corresponding percentages in Panel B are not statistically different.
2.4 The Relationship Between Start Time and Performance
The simple relationship in test scores for start times for math and reading scores can be seen in
figures 2.2 and 2.3. These figures present the empirical cumulative distribution function of test
scores in schools with earlier (Tier I) and later (Tier II) start times. For both the reading and math
test, the cumulative distribution for late-starting schools first-order stochastically dominates the
distribution for early-starting schools; for every percentile a greater proportion of students score at
or below that percentile in the early-starting schools than in later starting schools.16 For example,
45% of students in early-starting schools have math test scores at or below the 50th percentile,
while only 36% of students at late-starting schools score at or below the 50th percentile.
These figures suggest that later start times positively impact student performance. Since there
are other differences between early- and late-starting schools, the simple relationship between
test scores and start times should not be viewed as representing the impact of later start times. I
estimate several regression models to account for observed characteristics and unobserved effects.
Without any fixed-effects, the specifications have the basic form:
15The differences in the percentage characteristics in panel B and the corresponding variables in panel A is mainly
a result of Panel B being unweighted.
16In an alternate specification (not shown), I restricted the estimates to schools that started at either 7:30 or 8:15
(roughly 75% of the sample). Results were highly similar to those in figures 2.2 and 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Means by Start Time for 2000 & 2006
Panel A: Student Characteristics
2000 2006
Tier I Tier II Tier I Tier II
Female 0.495 0.481 0.494 0.490
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 13.545 13.544 13.630 13.620
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Black 0.240 0.207 0.247 0.249
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hispanic 0.0516 0.0253 0.102 0.0721
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Free Lunch Eligible 0.237 0.140 0.284 0.243
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Parent’s Education 14.86 15.00 14.45 14.81
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Math Score 55.92 59.63 56.29 61.41
(0.285) (0.37) (0.347) (0.336)
Reading Score 56.5 59.49 54.65 60.1
(0.278) (0.362) (0.336) (0.325)
Number of Students 10544 6082 7191 7675
Panel B: School Characteristics
2000 2006
Tier I Tier II Tier I Tier II
% Black 0.256 0.237 0.292 0.289
(0.034) (0.046) (0.050) (0.054)
% Hispanic 0.0443 0.0261 0.103 0.0714
(0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017)
% Free Lunch Eligibile 0.239 0.156 0.294 0.250
(0.060) (0.080) (0.051) (0.055)
Avg. Parent Education 14.90 14.89 14.61 14.68
(0.238) (0.322) (0.364) (0.420)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 15.65 14.80 14.91 15.66
(0.47) (0.63) (0.38) (0.40)
Enrollment 958.5 1013.7 898.9 1096.4
(87.6) (118.5) (49.0) (52.4)
Avg. math score 56.14 58.48 55.88 61.03
(2.59) (3.51) (4.22) (4.51)
Avg. Reading Score 56.78 58.23 54.22 59.71
(2.45) (3.31) (3.01) (3.22)
Start Time 7:32 8:01 7:30 8:14
(0:01) (0:02) (0:01) (0:01)
Schools 11 6 8 7
Tier I: 7:30-7:45. Tier II: 8:00-8:45. Standard errors in parentheses. Panel B is unweighted.
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Figure 2.2: Empirical Cumulative Distribution of Math Test Scores by Start Time Tier
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Note: Data includes all middle school students in non-magnet schools in the Wake County Public
School System from 1999-2006. Test score is the percentile rank on the end of grade math test
administered to all students in North Carolina.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical Cumulative Distribution of Reading Test Scores by Start Time Tier
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Note: Data includes all middle school students in non-magnet schools in the Wake County Public
School System from 1999-2006. Test score is the percentile rank on the end of grade reading test
administered to all students in North Carolina.
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yijt = βSTARTjt +X
′
ijtγ + Z
′
jtδ + ijt (2.1)
Here yijt is the test score of student i who attends school j in year t. STARTjt is the start time of
school j in year t, measured in hours after midnight. Xijt is a vector of individual characteristics
(not all of which vary over time) including gender, race, age, economic status, grade and parental
education. Zjt is a vector of school characteristics including pupil-to-teacher ratio, racial and
economic composition, magnet status, and ijt is the error term.
In order to isolate different sources of variation, I use different fixed effects in some specifi-
cations. Most specifications include a year specific effect. Some specifications use a school fixed
effect, using only variation in start times within the same school, over time. A student fixed effect
identifies the impact of start times using only those students who had different start times in dif-
ferent years. This could occur in two ways: the student could switch to a new school which begins
at a different time, or the student’s school could change time. Finally a student-school fixed effect
uses only changes in start times for students who stay in the same school.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present results of nested models of math and reading test scores respectively.
These specifications use both variation in start times across and within schools. Each column adds
additional explanatory variables to the previous specification. Column 1 gives a simple regression
of test scores on start times, without any additional covariates. For both math and reading, the
coefficient on start time is quite large, 9.5 percentile points per hour for both tests.17 The effect
drops substantially as I add additional covariates. Column 2 adds individual characteristics (the
Xijt). The coefficient on start time drops to 4.5 for math and 4.8 for reading. This is not surprising
since students at early-starting schools are more likely to belong to an ethnic minority, be eligible
for free lunches and have less educated parents. The large effect found in column 1 reflects in part
these trends. When school characteristics are added to the specification in column 3, the effect
changes slightly to 4.8 for both tests. Column 4 adds year and grade effects and obtains a result
17Throughout the paper, I measure differences in start times in hours to ease interpretation. The difference between
early and late starting schools in the data is typically 45 minutes.
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of 2.9 percentile points for math and 3.2 percentile points for reading. The start time coefficient
decreases slightly as I add school characteristics, year and grade effects, but the drop is much less
than from column 1 to column 2. In all cases the effect is statistically different from zero at the 1%
level of significance.
As noted above, there are differences in observed demographic characteristics of students in
early and late starting schools. If there are also unobserved differences that are correlated with
start times, the results found in tables 2.4 and 2.5 may be a biased estimate of the true effect of
start times on academic performance. To account for this, I also estimate specifications that use
school and student-school fixed effects. The results are presented in table 2.6. The advantage
of these specifications is that any unobserved characteristics that do not change over time will be
captured by the relevant fixed effect. By disregarding the variation in start times across schools and
identifying the effect of later start times using only the variation in start time within a given school,
my estimates are less precise. In addition, only 28% of students in the sample experienced a change
in start times. Since the estimate of the impact of start times on test scores will be identified solely
by those schools or students who changed start times, I estimated the specification in column 4 of
tables 2.4 and 2.5 with the sample restricted to schools or students who experienced a change in
start times. Results (not shown) were similiar to those found in tables 2.4 and 2.5.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 2.6 estimate specifications using school fixed effects for the math
and reading test respectively. In this case the effect of a later start time is identified using only
the variation in start times within schools over time. The effect of a one-hour later start time is
a 2.1 percentile point increase in math test scores and a 1.5 percentile point increase in reading
test scores. The school fixed effect controls for all time invariant school level characteristics.
However, a remaining concern is that the characteristics of schools may change over time. To
address this issue, columns 3 and 4 use student-school fixed effects, identifying the impact of later
start times using only from students who experience a change in start time while remaining in the
same school. The effect of a one-hour later start time is 1.8 and 0.8 percentile points for math
and reading respectively. The results found using variation within students are generally lower
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Table 2.4: Specifications Using Variation Within and Across Schools: Math
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Start Time 9.478*** 4.486*** 4.838*** 2.919***
(2.425) (1.667) (1.660) (1.104)
Female -0.736*** -0.858*** -1.671***
(0.233) (0.228) (0.193)
Age -1.729*** -1.699*** -4.756***
(0.170) (0.168) (0.367)
Black -17.07*** -16.24*** -15.95***
(0.445) (0.369) (0.353)
Hispanic -4.891*** -5.239*** -5.586***
(0.558) (0.530) (0.501)
AG 23.30*** 23.02*** 23.17***
(0.438) (0.415) (0.388)
Learning Disability -6.492*** -7.594*** -12.63***
(1.998) (1.842) (1.193)
Limited English -11.47*** -12.68*** -12.45***
(0.972) (0.977) (1.096)
Parent Education 3.004*** 2.793*** 2.666***
(0.164) (0.127) (0.107)
Free Lunch -6.796*** -6.406*** -5.241***
(0.444) (0.357) (0.333)
Enrollment -0.00586 -0.00527*
(0.00363) (0.00316)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 0.0122 -0.0257
(0.0687) (0.0542)
% Black -16.38*** -18.54***
(5.725) (4.775)
% Hispanic 52.98*** 8.127
(15.42) (13.96)
% Free Lunch -3381.4 -398.9
(2473.4) (2049.2)
Year Effect No No No Yes
Grade Effect No No No Yes
Observations 102521 102521 102521 102521
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.452 0.464 0.490
Data is from WCPSS grades 6-8 during the 1999-2006 school years.
Dependent variable is score on end of grade math test. All specifica-
tions include a constant term. Additional ethnicity controls not reported.
Standard errors (robust to clustering at the school level) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Specifications Using Variation Within and Across Schools: Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Start Time 9.455*** 4.810*** 4.821*** 3.236***
(2.050) (1.292) (1.293) (0.790)
Female 3.325*** 3.233*** 2.608***
(0.203) (0.199) (0.180)
Age -1.475*** -1.465*** -3.527***
(0.136) (0.131) (0.280)
Black -16.22*** -15.54*** -15.30***
(0.321) (0.307) (0.305)
Hispanic -5.358*** -5.606*** -5.863***
(0.495) (0.475) (0.451)
Academically Gifted 19.99*** 19.79*** 19.93***
(0.356) (0.336) (0.313)
Learning Disability -7.028*** -7.884*** -12.13***
(1.586) (1.481) (1.088)
Limited English -19.11*** -19.96*** -19.74***
(0.785) (0.852) (0.919)
Parent Education 2.774*** 2.618*** 2.543***
(0.136) (0.113) (0.0955)
Free Lunch -6.943*** -6.666*** -5.749***
(0.408) (0.357) (0.355)
Enrollment -0.00293 -0.00240
(0.00276) (0.00248)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 0.0665 0.0314
(0.0614) (0.0436)
% Black -13.35*** -15.39***
(4.486) (3.305)
% Hispanic 46.35*** 10.42
(12.89) (10.24)
% Free Lunch -3382.3* -783.3
(1849.9) (1364.1)
Year Effect No No No Yes
Grade Effect No No No Yes
Observations 102265 102265 102265 102265
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.421 0.428 0.446
Data is from WCPSS grades 6-8 during the 1999-2006 school years.
Dependent variable is score on end of grade math test. All specifica-
tions include a constant term. Additional ethnicity controls not reported.
Standard errors (robust to clustering at the school level) in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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than those found using both variation within and across schools, but are still significantly different
from zero. The results for the reading test are lower than those from the math test. A possible
explanation for this finding is that math skills are more dependent on the school environment than
reading skills.
To investigate how the effect of later start times varies across the distribution of test scores, I
estimate the model given in equation 1 by quantile regression for each decile of the distribution. I
include a full set of explanatory variables, as well as year and grade dummy variables.18 Figures
2.4 and 2.5 present the conditional quantile effect of a one-hour later start time for the math and
reading tests graphically. The shaded area represents a 90% confidence interval for the point
estimate.19 The solid horizontal line is the corresponding OLS coefficient (columns 1 and 3 of
table 2.6) and the dotted horizontal lines is the OLS 90% confidence interval. For both tests, the
effect of later start times is much greater in the bottom half of the distribution, and is monotonicaly
decreasing after the third decile. This indicates that start times have a greater impact on the bottom
half of students. This is one possible explanation as to why my results differ from those found
in Hinrichs (2010). Hinrichs uses ACT test scores for students in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN
metro area. For his sample years, between 59 and 66 percent of high school students in Minnesota
took the ACT. As a result his sample does not include the students (the bottom portion of the
grade distribution) where I find the largest impact of start times. The larger impact on the lower
end of the grade distribution suggests that delaying school start times may be an especially relevant
policy change for school districts trying to meet minimum competency requirements (such as those
mandated in the No Child Left Behind Act).
Table 2.7 gives estimation results for an alternative sample and test score normalization. Each
entry is the coefficient on start time. Columns one and two show results for the math test, while
18This model does not include any fixed effects. Since the conditional quantile function is not a linear operator,
the interpretation and estimation of fixed effects is different in quantile regression than in OLS regression. In results
available on request, I estimate a quantile regression model including school fixed effects, using the two step estimator
proposed in Canay (2010), which models fixed effects as pure location shifts. The point estimates of conditional
quantile effects in this model have the same shape (decreasing after the third decile) as the results shown.
19Standard errors are estimated using the Huber sandwich procedure described in Koenker (2005).
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Table 2.6: Specifications Using Variation Within Schools Over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Reading Math Reading
Start Time 2.137*** 1.479*** 1.803*** 0.822**
(0.419) (0.427) (0.290) (0.346)
Female -1.746*** 2.523***
(0.131) (0.134)
Age -4.704*** -3.519*** -0.104 0.121
(0.119) (0.122) (0.266) (0.325)
Black -15.81*** -15.27***
(0.184) (0.188)
Hispanic -5.479*** -5.841***
(0.333) (0.341)
Academically Gifted 23.23*** 19.84*** 1.095*** 0.534
(0.182) (0.185) (0.290) (0.345)
Learning Disability -13.45*** -12.73*** 0.549** 0.0370
(0.191) (0.195) (0.258) (0.308)
Limited English -12.45*** -19.91*** -1.354* -1.070
(0.468) (0.492) (0.812) (0.971)
Parent Education 2.619*** 2.470*** -0.0347 0.0830**
(0.0418) (0.0426) (0.0351) (0.0417)
Free Lunch -5.518*** -5.995*** 0.0792 0.105
(0.193) (0.197) (0.228) (0.273)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio -0.114*** -0.0565** -0.0366** -0.0179
(0.0233) (0.0238) (0.0152) (0.0181)
Enrollment -0.000840 0.00112 -0.000827 0.000233
(0.000887) (0.000904) (0.000634) (0.000754)
% Black -2.698 -2.553 1.867 4.729**
(2.826) (2.885) (1.816) (2.163)
% Hispanic -41.30*** -21.35*** 5.029 3.842
(4.647) (4.745) (4.058) (4.831)
% Free Lunch -19.96 -194.8 -697.9 -633.6
(644.7) (656.9) (442.1) (526.0)
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect School Student-School School Student-School
Observations 100680 100680 100427 100427
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.89 0.33 0.83
Dependent variable is score on end of grade math or reading exam. All specifications
include a constant term. Additional ethnic controls omitted. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.4: Quantile Regression of Math Test Score on Start Time
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Note: Each point represents the conditional quantile effect of a one hour later start time on the
percentile rank on the end of grade math exam. The shaded area is a 90% confidence interval.
The solid horizontal line is the corresponding OLS estimate, and the dotted horizontal lines
bound a a 90% confidence interval of the OLS estimate. See text for additional details.
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Figure 2.5: Quantile Regression of Reading Test Score on Start Time
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Note: Each point represents the conditional quantile effect of a one hour later start time on the
percentile rank on the end of grade reading exam. The shaded area is a 90% confidence interval.
The solid horizontal line is the corresponding OLS estimate, and the dotted horizontal lines
bound a a 90% confidence interval of the OLS estimate. See text for additional details.
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columns three and four show results for the reading test. Columns one and three use both variation
within and across schools, while columns two and four use only variation within schools for given
students (a student-school fixed effect). The first row reproduces results found in tables 2.4, 2.5,
and 2.6 for comparison purposes. The second row expands the sample to include magnet schools.
Results are similar, but slightly smaller than those found excluding magnet schools. Since students
at magnet schools tend to have higher test scores, the quantile regression results found above may
explain these differences. The third row uses an alternate normalization of test scores. Instead of
constructing percentiles, I normalize test scores by subtracting the statewide mean and dividing by
the statewide standard deviation for a given grade and year. Results are very similar to those using
percentiles.20
Table 2.7: Results for Alternate Specifications and By Subpopulation
Panel A: Alternate Specifications
Math Math Reading Reading Sample Size
Full Specification 2.702*** 1.898*** 3.204*** 0.797** 100695
(0.942) (0.291) (0.566) (0.346)
Magnet Included 2.011** 1.442*** 2.684*** 0.744** 166664
(0.918) (0.244) (0.536) (0.292)
Z Scores 0.0928*** 0.0599*** 0.103*** 0.0297** 100695
(0.0328) (0.0100) (0.0208) (0.0122)
Columns 1 and 3 use both variation within and across schools (no fixed effect). Columns 2 and
4 use only variation within schools for specific students (student-school fixed effect). Sample
size is for math test, sample size for reading test is typically slightly smaller. Standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.5 Why Do Start Times Matter?
The typical explanation as to why later start times might increase academic achievement is that
by starting school later, students will get more sleep. As students enter adolescence, hormonal
changes make it difficult for them to compensate for early school start times by going to bed
20On average there are 30 percentiles to a standard deviation, so a 0.06 standard deviation effect is similar to a 1.8
percentile effect.
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Table 2.8: High School Comprehensive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Math Math Reading Reading Reading
Start Time 3.326** 4.355 3.711** 6.999
(1.327) (5.612) (1.482) (6.885)
Start Time 2.033*** 1.983*** 1.603** 1.553**
(8th Grade) (0.671) (0.673) (0.760) (0.760)
Female -3.435*** -3.655*** -3.656*** 2.640*** 2.450*** 2.449***
(0.271) (0.389) (0.389) (0.307) (0.446) (0.446)
Age -4.296*** -2.682*** -2.673*** -3.961*** -3.202*** -3.187***
(0.564) (0.840) (0.841) (0.656) (1.081) (1.081)
Black -12.23*** -10.58*** -10.58*** -13.07*** -11.17*** -11.17***
(0.407) (0.617) (0.617) (0.446) (0.681) (0.681)
Hispanic -6.593*** -3.416*** -3.405*** -6.807*** -4.375*** -4.360***
(0.832) (1.163) (1.163) (0.907) (1.316) (1.316)
Asian 2.851*** 1.624* 1.638* -4.042*** -4.221*** -4.198***
(0.619) (0.875) (0.875) (0.674) (0.954) (0.955)
Other -5.921*** -4.375*** -4.368*** -3.491*** -0.484 -0.474
(0.961) (1.610) (1.610) (1.089) (1.877) (1.880)
Gifted 11.71*** 12.30*** 12.30*** 13.07*** 14.58*** 14.58***
(0.356) (0.501) (0.501) (0.389) (0.547) (0.547)
Learning Disability -10.14*** -10.69*** -10.67*** -11.38*** -11.78*** -11.77***
(0.501) (0.751) (0.751) (0.560) (0.878) (0.878)
Limited English -4.279*** -7.943*** -7.947*** -15.27*** -13.46*** -13.51***
(1.130) (2.047) (2.046) (1.164) (2.142) (2.147)
Parent Education 1.024*** 1.095*** 1.100*** 1.319*** 1.174*** 1.179***
(0.0832) (0.145) (0.146) (0.0906) (0.154) (0.154)
Free/RP Lunch -2.669*** -3.416*** -3.410*** -3.394*** -4.243*** -4.244***
(0.592) (0.729) (0.730) (0.663) (0.840) (0.840)
Enrollment -0.00307** 0.0164** 0.0158* -0.00565*** 0.0364*** 0.0371***
(0.00135) (0.00822) (0.00814) (0.00152) (0.0126) (0.0127)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 0.188 -0.217 -0.311 0.475** -1.936 -2.272*
(0.164) (0.840) (0.867) (0.185) (1.191) (1.275)
% Black 17.36 -106.4*** -125.2*** 20.02 -45.75 -80.87
(12.13) (33.93) (44.51) (13.33) (38.69) (53.44)
% Hispanic -94.57*** -127.8** -125.2** -35.56 -91.87 -94.54
(24.81) (61.95) (61.76) (27.73) (68.99) (69.11)
% Free/RP Lunch -3.459 129.8*** 135.8*** -12.45 40.78 53.67
(6.552) (34.47) (36.49) (7.626) (38.11) (40.96)
Observations 18491 8512 8512 18221 8338 8338
Dependent variable is score on high school comprehensive math or reading exam. All specifications
include year, course and high school effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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earlier. Since students enter adolescence during their middle school years, examining the effect of
start times as students age provides a test of the “adolescent hormone” explanation. To do this, I
separated students in my sample by quarter years of age and estimated the effect of start time on
test scores separately for each group (including a full set of covariates and a student-school fixed
effect). Figures 2.6 and 2.7 presents these results. The shaded area is a 95% confidence interval.
For both tests, the effect is relatively flat until age 13, when it begins to increase and continues to
increase through the rest of the observed age range. This provides evidence that at least part of the
effect of later start times is due to increased sleep.
To further investigate how the effect of later start times varies with age, I estimate the effect of
start times on upper elementary (grades 3-5) students and high school students. If adolescent hor-
mones are the mechanism through which start times affect academic performance, pre-adolescent
elementary students should not be affected by early start times. Results for elementary students
are shown in table 2.9. The first two columns present results using a student-school fixed effect.
Start times had no effect on elementary students regardless of the specification used. However,
elementary schools start much later than middle schools (over half of elementary schools begin
at 9:15, and almost all of the rest begin at 8:15). As a result, it is not clear if there is no effect
because start times do not impact the academic performance of prepubescent students, or because
the schools start much later and only early start times effect performance. Columns 3 and 4 present
results using the (future) start times in grade 6. These specifications serve as a falsification test. If
students with higher test scores in elementary school tend to be assigned to later starting schools,
the coefficient on 6th grade start time would be positive. That is not the case here, the effect of
grade 6 start times is statistically insignificant and has a negative sign.
High school students do not take a specific test at the end of each grade. Instead they are
required to take an exam at the end of specific courses, such as geometry or physical science.
There is no explicit requirement for the grade in which each course is to be taken, and the typical
sequence often varies from school to school. For example, in some schools, students typically take
Geometry before Algebra II, while in others they take Geometry after Algebra II. Furthermore
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Figure 2.6: Effect of Start Time on Math Test Score by Age
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Note: Each point represents the effect of a one-hour later start time on the percentile rank on the
end of grade math exam. The shaded area is a 95% confidence interval. Age is measured in
quarter years as of January 1. See text for additional details.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of Start Time on Reading Test Score by Age
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Note: Each point represents the effect of a one-hour later start time on the percentile rank on the
end of grade reading exam. The shaded area is a 95% confidence interval. Age is measured in
quarter years as of January 1. See text for additional details.
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Table 2.9: Results for Elementary Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Reading Math Reading
Start Time -0.217 0.118
(0.196) (0.214)
Start Time -0.404 -0.471
(Grade 6) (0.289) (0.280)
Female 1.130 -0.359 -1.645*** 2.587***
(1.745) (2.106) (0.192) (0.186)
Age 0.0292 0.00233 -0.124 -0.574***
(0.287) (0.248) (0.186) (0.189)
Black 1.263 -0.926 -22.05*** -19.04***
(1.608) (1.716) (0.275) (0.268)
Hispanic 3.270 2.133 -13.11*** -13.28***
(1.995) (2.129) (0.535) (0.512)
Academically Gifted 0.0248 -0.0314 10.31*** 10.73***
(0.149) (0.173) (0.147) (0.158)
Learning Disability 1.430*** 0.965*** -7.909*** -9.964***
(0.217) (0.229) (0.256) (0.259)
Limited English -0.0829 -1.240** -5.998*** -8.774***
(0.516) (0.552) (0.544) (0.547)
[.75em] Parent Education -0.0956*** -0.0924** 1.288*** 1.536***
(0.0362) (0.0398) (0.0385) (0.0410)
Free Lunch -0.425* -0.238 -6.079*** -6.668***
(0.242) (0.264) (0.224) (0.231)
P/T Ratio 0.00166 0.0145 -0.0726*** 0.00822
(0.0264) (0.0290) (0.0267) (0.0282)
Enrollment -0.00235*** -0.000797 -0.00171*** -0.00190***
(0.000714) (0.000782) (0.000604) (0.000626)
% Black -2.863*** 0.836 -12.85*** -7.421***
(0.981) (1.076) (0.792) (0.813)
% Hispanic 4.404** 3.708* -5.443*** -3.078*
(1.860) (2.030) (1.684) (1.732)
% Free Lunch 437.9 -55.85 905.9** -467.0
(409.9) (442.9) (404.5) (424.1)
Observations 168474 167552 99413 99037
Dependent variable is score on end of course math or reading exam. Additional con-
trols omitted. All columns include grade and year effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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some students take these end-of-course exams in eighth grade (particularly Algebra I). However,
all students are required to take the “High School Comprehensive Exam” at the end of grade 10.21
The comprehensive exam measures growth in reading and math since the end of grade eight and
is in most respects similar to the end of grade tests taken in grades 3-8. An important distinction
is that students taking the comprehensive exam may not be enrolled in a math class during their
sophomore year. Table 2.4 presents estimation results for the high school comprehensive test.
Columns 1 and 4 use the high school start time, columns 2 and 5 use the student’s start time in
8th grade and columns 3 and 6 use both. Each specification uses a school fixed effect and so
are comparable to the middle school results found in columns 1 and 3 of tables 2.6. The effect
of a one-hour-later start time in grade ten is slightly larger than the effect in middle school: 3.3
percentiles on the math test and 3.7 percentiles on the reading test. A one-hour later start time in
eighth grade increases test scores on the high school comprehensive exam by 2.0 percentile points
for math and 1.6 percentile points for reading. When both start times are included in the same
specification, results are similar, although the results for high school are imprecise. In comparison,
the effect was 2.1 percentile points for math and 1.5 percentiles for reading in grade eight. This
indicates that the negative impact of early start times persists over time.
Increased sleep is not the only possible reason why later starting students have higher test
scores. Students in early-starting schools could be more likely to skip breakfast. Since they also
get out of school earlier, they could spend more (or less) time playing sports, watching television
or doing homework. They could be more likely to be absent, tardy or have behavioral problems
in school. Other explanations are possible as well. While my data do not allow me to explore all
possible mechanisms, I present evidence in favor or against some explanations below.
A unique aspect of the NCERDC data set is that it includes self-reported amounts of television
watched per day and time spent doing homework per week. Column 1 of table 2.5 shows the
result of a regression of minutes of television per day against start time and a full set of covariates.
21Due to changes in state policy, the High School Comprehensive Exam exam was not administered in the 2001-02,
2004-05 or 2005-06 school years.
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Students who start school one hour later watch 15 fewer minutes of television per day. In Column
2, I regress minutes of homework per week against start time. Students who start school 1 hour
later spend 17 minutes more on homework per week.22 These results could be a result of students
who start school earlier spending more time at home alone. Students who start school earlier also
come home from school earlier and likely go to bed earlier. As a result, early-starting students
spend more time at home alone and less time at home with their parents, relative to late starting
students. If students watch television when they are home alone and do their homework when their
parents are home, this could explain why students who start school later have higher test scores.
Another way of putting this is that it is not early start times that matter, but early end times.
The existing start times literature tends to find that students in early-starting schools are both
more likely to be tardy to school and to be absent.23 The data set used in this paper only has data
on absences for two years: the 2003-04 and 2004-05 school years. Since no schools had a change
in start time between those two years (there was one new school), I can only consider variation in
start times across schools. Column 3 of table 2.5 presents the results of a regression of days absent
per year on start time and a full set of covariates. Students who start school one hour later have 1.3
fewer absences (the median student has five absences). Reduced absences may explain why later
starting students have higher test scores. Students who have an early start time miss more school
(this may or may not be a result of getting less sleep) and as a result perform worse on standardized
tests.
2.6 Conclusion
Later school start times have been often cited in the popular press as a way to increase student
performance. However, there has not been much empirical evidence supporting this claim or
calculating how large of an effect later start times might have. Using variation in start times
22For both television and homework, the results are similar if I use a school fixed effect, identifying the differences
based only on the variation in start times within schools.
23See for example (Wahlstrom, 2000).
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Table 2.10: Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3)
TV Homework Absences
Start Time -15.25*** 16.94*** -1.309***
(1.763) (4.293) (0.335)
Female -7.914*** 23.87*** -0.301**
(0.802) (1.100) (0.117)
Age 1.905*** -5.890*** 2.258***
(0.639) (0.890) (0.154)
Black 62.13*** -20.43*** -1.095***
(1.023) (1.385) (0.212)
Hispanic 6.490*** 1.330 -2.122***
(1.548) (2.177) (0.262)
Asian -8.299*** 24.62*** -3.089***
(1.606) (2.477) (0.234)
Other 19.74*** -8.364*** 0.261
(2.061) (2.888) (0.248)
Parent Education -4.759*** 7.200*** -0.502***
(0.224) (0.431) (0.0402)
Free Lunch 7.487*** -6.763*** 2.510***
(1.187) (1.534) (0.149)
Enrollment 0.00245 -0.0000605 0.00364***
(0.00587) (0.0156) (0.000993)
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 0.0824 -0.610* -0.0277
(0.108) (0.314) (0.0374)
% Black 65.43*** -60.59*** 4.551*
(5.667) (13.75) (2.637)
% Hispanic -50.43** -66.54 -5.826
(23.31) (46.75) (4.842)
% Free Lunch 4322.1 -10963.8 261.3
(4090.5) (10870.0) (2832.9)
Constant 276.5*** 69.87** -11.61***
(17.11) (31.29) (3.240)
Observations 101645 101692 30896
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.058 0.104
TV is measured in minutes per day, Homework in minutes per
week, and Absences in days per year. Standard errors (robust
to clustering at the school level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 See text for additional details.
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both within and across schools, I find that an increase in start times by one hour would lead to
a 3 percentile point gain in both math and reading test scores for the average student. Using
only variation within schools the effect is 2 percentile points for math and 1 percentile point for
reading. The impact of middle school start times on test scores persists into the tenth grade. The
effect is larger for the lower end of the distribution of test grades. I find evidence that reduced
sleep, combined with the adolescent hormonal cycle is a mechanism through which start times
may affect test scores. I also find evidence supporting time at home with parents as a mechanism.
These results suggest that delaying start times may be a cost-effective method of increasing
student performance. Since the effect of later start times is stronger for the lower end of the dis-
tribution of test scores, later start times may be particularly effective in meeting accountability
standards that require a minimum level of competency. If elementary students are not affected
by later start times (which can not be definitively determined from my data), it may be possible
to increase test scores for middle school students at zero cost by having elementary schools start
first. Alternatively, the entire schedule could be shifted later into the day. However, these changes
may be politically unfeasible due to childcare constraints for younger students, and jobs and after
school activities for older students. A third option would be to eliminate tiered busing schedules
and have all schools begin at the same time. A plausible estimate of the cost of moving start times
later is the additional cost of running a single tier bus system. The WCPSS Transportation Depart-
ment estimates that over a ten year period from 1993-2003, using a three-tiered bus system saved
roughly $100 million in transportation costs (Wake County Public School System Department of
Transportation, 2004). With approximately 100,000 students per year divided into three tiers, it
would cost roughly $150 per student each year to move each student in two earliest start time tiers
to the latest start time. In comparison, Krueger (1999) finds the reducing class size by one third
increases test scores by 4 percentile ranks in the first year at a cost of $2151 per student per year.
While very rough, these calculations suggest that increased spending on bus transportation, in or-
der to delay the beginning of the school day, may be substantially cheaper than reducing class size
to gain the same improvement in test scores.
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Chapter 3
Expectations of Future Subsidies and
Educational Enrollment
3.1 Introduction
Poverty reduction programs are often evaluated using a structured roll out, in which households
are randomly assigned into groups that begin receiving program benefits at staggered dates. The
randomization is then exploited to identify the causal impact of the program by comparing house-
holds that have already begun to receive program benefits to households that have not yet received
program benefits. However, in cases where the program is designed to elicit a behavioral response,
forward looking households may modify their behavior in advance of program implementation in
expectation of future program benefits.
In this paper, I use a regression discontinuity research design to examine the case of Progresa,
a conditional cash transfer system in rural Mexico with a structured roll out. Eligible households
in two-thirds of the evaluation villages began receiving cash grants in the fall of 1998, while
grants were delayed until 2000 for the remaining villages. I estimate program impact on eligible
households prior to the initiation of program benefits, and find that for secondary school students
living in delayed-treatment villages, eligibility for cash grants increases the probability by 5.0
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percent in November 1999, one year before cash grants begin. For households that had already
begun to receive grants, the effect is a 10.9 percent increase in the probability of enrollment.
This result is robust to non-parametric and parametric specifications as well as to the choice of
bandwidth and smoothing kernel used.
3.2 Program and Data Description
Progresa is a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico targeted at increasing the human capital
(both education and health), of poor households. It consists primarily of two components: an
educational grant conditional on childrens school attendance, and a food subsidy conditional on
family visits to health clinics. The transfers are paid bimonthly to mothers. The Progresa program
now has over 5 million beneficiary households representing roughly a quarter of the Mexican
population and is active in all 31 Mexican states. At its inception in 1997, it was one of the first
large scale conditional cash transfer programs to be implemented. It is widely recognized as being
extremely effective in accomplishing its human capital goals and compares favorably to other
welfare programs on outcome and cost measures (See Parker and Skoufias (2000); Schultz (2004);
Skoufias and McClafferty (2001); Todd andWolpin (2006) for examples). As a result of Progresa’s
success, numerous programs in other locations have been modeled after Progresa, including Bolsa
Familia in Brazil, Juntos in Peru and Opportunity NYC in New York City McMahon (2007). 1
The data used in this paper comes from the Progresa evaluation surveys. From inception, Pro-
gresa was designed with evaluation in mind. Several independent agencies were involved in the
program design to ensure that proper evaluation would be possible, most notable the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The initial evaluation of Progresa was carried out in ru-
ral villages in seven Mexican states: Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacn, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis
Potos, and Veracruz. In 1997, villages were evaluated based on existing national census data to
determine program eligibility. In order to be eligible, villages had to be located in a rural area,
1Other programs exist in Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, and Uruguay.
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have a high level of poverty, have between 50 and 2,500 inhabitants and have access to schools
and health clinics.
The eligible villages were randomly assigned to two groups for the purpose of evaluation:
villages in the initial-treatment group began receiving program benefits in 1998, while those in
the delayed-treatment group did not receive benefits until 2000.2 A socioeconomic survey was
administered in October 1997 that determined household level eligibility and served as a baseline
for program analysis. After the baseline survey was completed Progresa staff used discriminant
analysis to determine which observed characteristics (such as household income, composition,
and dwelling conditions) best distinguish poor households (defined as 320 pesos per person per
month)from non-poor households. They then combined the selected characteristics into an index,
called the discriminant score, that measures the degree of poverty in a given household. Next, a
region specific cutoff was determined for program eligibility - households with a score below the
cutoff were eligible for transfers, and those above were not. Roughly two thirds of all households
were eligible. Nearly all households who were eligible participated in the program. After the 1997
survey was completed, a village assembly was called. This assembly disclosed the details of the
program as well as which households would be eligible. Crucial to my paper is that households
in both treatment and control villages were informed of their eligibility at the beginning of the
evaluation period. For further details about the evaluation program, see Instituto Nacional de
Salud Pu´blica (2005).
Table 3.1 gives the monthly per child education grant given to mothers in eligible households
during the first six months of the Progresa evaluation period. Children had to be between eight
and sixteen years old, and enrolled in grades three through six of primary school or in secondary
school.3 The amount of the grant increased with age, to reflect the increased cost of forgone wages.
2The Progresa surveys and documentation refer to these groups as “treatment” and “control”. As the goal of this
paper is to estimate the impact of Progresa on the “control” villages, I use the terms “initial-treatment” and “delayed-
treatment,” which I believe is more accurate.
3The education system in Mexico consists of six grades of primeria (primary school), three grades of secondaria
(secondary school, analogous to middle school in the United States.) and three grades of either preparatoria (college
preparatory high school) or bachillerato (trade oriented high school). Enrollment is high in primary school, but drops
dramatically in secondary and high school.
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Every six months, the grants were increased to compensate for inflation, based off of the Bank of
Mexico’s consumer price index. In secondary school, girls were eligible for a higher grant than
boys, in an effort to combat lower enrollment rates for girls. Grants were contingent upon children
maintaining a 85% of better attendence rate (exclusive of excused medical absences). Eligbible
households also received a food grant and medical care. Further details on the grant process can
be found in (Schultz, 2004).
Table 3.1: Initial Progresa Transfers
Level Grade All Male Female
Primaria 3 70 - -
4 80 - -
5 105 - -
6 135 - -
Secundaria 1 - 200 210
2 - 210 235
3 - 225 255
Initial (July-December 1998) monthly transfers
per child in pesos. Transfers are conditional on
school enrollment and 85% attendance. Source:
Schultz (2004)
In 1999, the Progresa program underwent a process called densification, where the process for
calculating discriminant scores was revised, and previously non-eligible households were added
to the list of eligible recipients. Skoufias and McClafferty (2001) reports that this was done out of
concern that the initial screening process excluded too many elderly couples who no longer had
children living in the household. At the conclusion of the evaluation period, it was discovered
that due to an administrative error, over 85% of the newly eligible households did not receive any
payments. Due to the uncertainty of the staus of these households, I exclude them frommy sample.
Since the densification process was targeted at childless households, this only effects 6.7% of my
sample. All results are similar if these households are included, either as eligible or ineligible.
Table 3.2 compares demographic characteristics of eligible and non-eligible individuals for
treatment and delayed treatment villages in October 1997. Only individuals between 8 and 16 years
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Table 3.2: Demographic Characteristics by Type
Initial Treatment Delayed Treatment
Eligible Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible
Age 11.64 12.34 11.67 12.36
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Female 0.48 0.48 0.5 0.5
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Speaks Dialect 0.34 0.21 0.37 0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lives with Father 0.86 0.82 0.86 0.82
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bathroom in Home 0.56 0.67 0.57 0.71
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
TV in Home 0.36 0.73 0.41 0.78
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HH Income 22,621 39,517 17,879 30,121
(6129) (9269) (2756) (3961)
Number of Individuals 12,779 6,489 7,732 4,298
Number of Villages 320 320 186 186
Data is from ENCASEH97 survey. Sample includes all individuals ages 8-16 in 1997.
Household income is in nominal pesos per year. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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old are included. Eligible children in initial-treatment villages are very similar to eligible children
in delayed-treatment villages. Likewise, non-eligible children are very similar. Within both initial-
treatment and delayed-treatment villages, eligible and non-eligible children differ markedly. Eli-
gible children are younger, less likely to have a television or bathroom in their home, more likely
to speak a dialect or indigenous language and less likely to live with their father. Since eligibility
is based on a poverty score, these differences are not surprising.
3.3 Methods
In order to estimate the impact of Progresa on school enrollment in the delayed-treatment vil-
lages, I use regression discontinuity research design. In contrast to random assignment where the
delayed-treatment villages serve as a comparison group for the initial-treatment group, I compare
individuals just below the eligibility cutoff with individuals just above the cutoff. Since the cutoff
for eligibility varies by region, I construct a scaled discriminant score by subtracting the cutoff
from the original discriminant score constructed by Progresa staff. This then becomes the forc-
ing variable that determines eligibility: households with a negative scaled discriminant score are
eligible to receive grants, while those with positive scores are not.
Eligibility for Progresa grants was intended to be strict, with all households under the cutoff
eligible for grants, and no households above the cutoff eligible. In practice, however, a small num-
ber of households were misclassified and received grants even though they were above the cutoff
(and vice-versa).4 As a result, I do not estimate use a “sharp” regression discontinuity design, but
rather a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity design. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), program
impact is the ratio of the jump in enrollment at the cutoff divided by the jump in the probability of
eligibility at the cutoff. Formally, it is the Wald estimator:
τFRD =
limx↓cE[Enrolled|x]− limx↑cE[Enrolled|x]
limx↓cE[Eligible|x]− limx↑cE[Eligible|x] . (3.1)
4Only 5.5% of households were misclassified; 80% of those were above the cutoff but still received grants.
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Here x is the discriminant score and c is the cutoff value. In practical terms, the jump in
the probability of eligibility is close to one (about 0.90) so the results are driven by the jump in
enrollment. To estimate τFRD I follow the approach outlined in Han et al. (2001) and estimate both
the numerator and denominator of equation 3.1 non-parametrically using kernel-weighted local
linear regressions. Standard errors are computed using 2000 bootstrap replications. In section 3.5
I also estimate the effect parametrically as a robustness check. Formally, I let
(αˆl, βˆl) = argmin
αl,βl
∑
i:c−h≤Xi≤c
[Enrolledi − αl − βl ∗ (Xi − c)2] ∗Kh(Xi − x) (3.2)
and
(αˆr, βˆr) = arg min
αr,βr
∑
i:c≤Xi≤c+h
(Enrolledi − αr − βr ∗ (Xi − c)2)Kh(Xi − x). (3.3)
Here K() is a weighting kernel and h is the kernel bandwidth. As before, x is the discriminant
score and c is the cutoff value. Then αˆr−αˆl gives the estimated jump in enrollment at the eligibility
cutoff. In a similar manner, let
(γˆl, δˆl) = argmin
γl,δl
∑
i:c−h≤Xi≤c
(Eligiblei − γl − δl ∗ (Xi − c)2)Kh(Xi − x) (3.4)
and
(γˆr, δˆr) = argmin
γr,δr
∑
i:c≤Xi≤c+h
(Eligiblei − γr − δr ∗ (Xi − c)2)Kh(Xi − x). (3.5)
Then γˆr− γˆl gives the estimated jump in enrollment at the eligibility cutoff. Comining both results
gives the fuzzy regression discontinuity estimate of the impact of Progresa eligibility on school
enrollment:
ˆτFRD =
αˆr − αˆl
γr − γˆl (3.6)
A critical aspect of regression discontinuity estimation is the selection of the kernel bandwidth.
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I employ the Imbens-Kalyanaram bandwidth selection criteria, which is shown to be optimal (in
the sense of minimizing mean squared error) at the discontinuity in Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2009). Since the choice of bandwidth may influence the estimate of program impact, it is de-
sirable to use the same bandwidth for both initial-treatment and delayed-treatment villages, and
for each year of the evaluation period. The optimal bandwidths range from 88.1 to 115.7 scaled
discriminant points. Because the primary interest of this paper is the behavior of households in
delayed-treatment villages prior to the initiation of their grants, I use the optimal bandwidth for
delayed-treatment villages in November 1999 for both types and all years. The optimal bandwidth
in that period is 91.1. In section 3.5, I explore the sensitivity of my estimates to the choice of
bandwidth.
In addition to the choice of bandwidth, another factor that may influence the estimation of the
program effect is the choice of the smoothing kernel to use in the local linear regressions. I employ
a triangular kernel, which has been shown to be boundary optimal (Cheng et al. (1997)). In section
3.5, I examine how my estimates differ when other kernels are used instead.
3.4 Results
Table 3.4 presents RD estimates of the impact of eligibility on primary school enrollment in initial-
treatment and delayed-treatment villages for each of the four fall surveys. Eligibility has no dis-
cernible impact on enrollment in either group of villages. Since enrollment is high (over 95 percent
in all years) among elementary students, this is not surprising. If Progresa eligibility has an effect
on primary school enrollment, it would almost certainly be small and unable to be detected given
the precision of the regression-discontinuity estimates.
Table 3.4 gives corresponding estimates for secondary school enrollment. I restrict the sample
to children who are old enough to be in secondary school (ages 12-16) and have completed primary
school. For initial-treatment villages, Progresa eligibility has a large impact on enrollment in each
year that grants were given - an increase in the probability of enrollment of 0.09 in 1998 and 0.10
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Table 3.3: RD Estimates of Program Impact - Primary Grades
Oct. 1997 Oct. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Initial-Treatment Villages -0.003 0.0167 -0.0053 0.0190
(0.0175) (0.0225) (0.0057) (0.0299)
Delayed-Treatment Villages 0.0025 0.0204 -0.0158 0.0104
(0.0159) (0.0265) (0.0170) (0.0234)
Estimates are the increase in the probability of school enrollment at the eligibility cutoff due to
program eligibility. Data consists of children aged 8-11, who have not yet completed primary
school. October 1997 was the pre-program survey (no one received benefits). October 1998
and November 1999 was the evaluation period (treated children received program benefits,
control children did not). November 2000 was the first post-evaluation period (all eligible
children received benefits). Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01
in 1999 and 2000. For comparison purposes, enrollment was 58% in the 1997 baseline survey.
Table 3.4: RD Estimates of Program Impact - Secondary School
Oct. 1997 Oct. 1998 Nov. 1999 Nov. 2000
Initial-Treatment Villages -0.005 0.0902*** 0.1090*** 0.0984***
(0.0211) (0.0260) (0.0294) (0.0275)
Delayed-Treatment Villages -0.0177 0.0279 0.0504** 0.0724***
(0.034) (0.0298) (0.0236) (0.0238)
Estimates are the increase in the probability of school enrollment at the eligibility cutoff due
to program eligibility. Data consists of children aged 12-16, who have completed primary
school. October 1997 was the pre-program survey (no one received benefits). October 1998 and
November 1999 was the evaluation period (treated children received program benefits, control
children did not). November 2000 was the first post-evaluation period (all eligible children
received benefits). Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For delayed-treatment villages, Progresa eligibility (for future grants) resulted in a 0.05 in-
crease in the probability of enrollment in 1999, the year before eligible households started receiv-
ing grants. The effect is statistically insignificant in 1998. For 2000, when eligible households
began receiving grants, the effect is a 0.07 increase in the probability of enrollment. These results
suggest that households change their behavior in advance of actually receiving cash grants; they
are more likely to enroll their children in secondary school if the will receive a grant for school en-
rollment next year. Supporting this explanation is the structure of the grants. Since the amount of
the grant is larger in higher grades, part of the motivation for children in initial-treatment villages
may be to obtain larger grants in the future as well.
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An advantage of a regression discontinuity approach is that it allows for graphical representa-
tion of the effect of Progresa eligibility. Figure 3.1 presents results for November 1999. In each
panel, a scatter plot of each observation is plotted. Local linear regressions are used to produce a
fitted curve on either side of the eligibility discontinuity - solid below and dashed above.5 The re-
sults shown in table 3.4 above are then the ratio of the jump in enrollment to the jump in eligibility
at the cutoff. Panels 3.1a and 3.1c show results for initial-treatment villages, and panels 3.1b and
3.1d show results for delay-treatment villages. For both groups, the probability of enrollment is
generally increasing with the scaled discriminant score (an indicator of impoverishment). At the
eligibility cutoff, both groups show a distinct jump. For both groups there is a large jump in the
likelihood of being eligible at the cutoff, but it is less than 1.
The regression discontinuity approach assumes that the effect of Progresa eligibility is “As
good as randomly assigned” for individuals on either side of the cutoff. One way to test this
assumption is to examine the behavior of other characteristics at the cutoff. Table 3.4 presents
RD estimates for several characteristics in November 1999. In each case, there is no significant
discontinuity at the cutoff; individuals just below the cutoff have similarly sized households, are
just as likely to speak a dialect or indigenous language, are just as likely to have their father living
with them, and are of similar ages. Figure 3.2 presents graphical results for delayed-treatment
villages. While each variable varies with the discriminant score, there is no discernible jump at
the discontinuity. Even though the average characteristics of eligible an non-eligible households
differ (as in table 3.2 above), the characteristics evolve smoothly over the eligibility cutoff, which
is what is required for the regression discontinuity estimates to be unbiased.
3.5 Robustness Checks
While the regression discontinuity results presented above are non-parametric, they do depend
on two factors: the choice of the smoothing kernel used and the bandwidth. If the results for
5The behavior of the fitted curves at the extreme values can safely be ignored, as it is the result of a very small
number of observations and does not influence the jump at the cutoff.
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Table 3.5: Discontinuity of Covariates at the Eligibility Cutoff
HH Size Dialect Age Father Present
Initial-Treatment Villages -0.077 -0.006 -0.077 -0.001
(0.049) (0.018) (0.095) (0.0125)
Delayed-Treatment Villages -0.244 -0.004 -0.013 -0.016
(0.166) (0.018) (0.11) (0.015)
Data includes all individuals ages 12-16, who have completed primary school in November 1999.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
a different kernel or for a different bandwidth are substantially different for the results using a
triangular kernel and a bandwidth of 91.1, the robustness of my initial results would be called
suspect.
Table 3.5 presents regression discontinuity estimates for bandwidths ranging from 50 to 150
discriminant points. All estimates are for October 1999, the last year before eligible households in
the delayed treatment villages began receiving grants. For the initial treatment villages, estimates
using each bandwidths are similar to the estimate of 0.1090 found for a bandwidth of 91.1. The
estimates for smaller bandwidths are somewhat larger (0.1331 for a bandwidth of 50), but in all
cases they remain within one standard error. Similarly for the delayed treatment villages, the
estimates are generally similar to the 0.0504 found for a bandwidth of 91.1. For a bandwidth of
50, the estimate is somewhat smaller, but with a much larger standard error.
Table 3.6: RD Estimates for November 1999 by Bandwidth
Bandwidth 50 75 100 125 150
Initial-Treatment Villages 0.1331*** 0.1197*** 0.1041*** 0.1002*** 0.1005***
(0.0354) (0.027) (0.0272) (0.0222) (0.0195)
Delayed-Treatment Villages 0.0350 0.0501 0.0516* 0.0554** 0.0502**
(0.0418) (0.0325) (0.0278) (0.0261) (0.023)
All results use a triangular kernel. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.5 lists regression discontinuity estimates using different kernels. As in table 3.5, all re-
sults are from October 1999. Different kernels place different weights on observations within the
bandwidth window and as a result produce different estimates. The first column uses the triangular
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kernel, the kernel used in table 3.4 above. This kernel places more weight on observations closer
to the discontinuity, with the weight assigned declining in a linear manner. The second column
uses the rectangular kernel, which places equal weight on all observations within the bandwidth
window. The third column uses the gaussian kernel which assigns weights according to a normal
distribution centered at the discontinuity, using the bandwidth as the variance.6 Last, the fourth
column uses the epanechnikov kernel, which minimizes asymptotic mean squared error. For both
initial treatment and delayed treatment villages, estimates of the program effect are slightly larger
using the triangular kernel than for any of the other kernels. However, the difference in the esti-
mates is less than one standard error.
Table 3.7: RD Estimates for November 1999 by Kernel Type
Kernel Type Triangular Rectangular Gaussian Epanechnikov
Initial-Treatment Villages 0.1099*** 0.0821*** 0.0993*** 0.0996***
(0.0294) (0.0243) (0.0153) (0.0205)
Delayed-Treatment Villages 0.0504** 0.0466** 0.0477** 0.0449**
(0.0236) (0.0215) (0.0198) (0.0206)
Data includes all individuals ages 12-16 in 1999, who have completed primary school. Standard errors
in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As I final robustness check, I estimate the program effect using an alternate parametric speci-
fication:
Enrolledi = α+ βEligiblei + h(yi) + γXi + i (3.7)
where Enrolledi is an indicator of student i being enrolled in school, Eligiblei is an indicator
of program eligibility, h(yi) is a smooth function of the scaled discriminant score yi and Xi are
additional demographic characteristics. Table 3.5 presents OLS estimates of equation 3.7 for both
groups of villages in November 1999, modeling h(y) as a low order polynomial. Columns 1
and 2 use a linear specification, columns 3 and 4 a quadratic, and columns 5 and 6 a cubic. As
in the non-parametric case, if individuals on either side of the eligibility cutoff are similar, ad-
ditional covariates should not effect the estimate of program impact. To examine this, the even
6The gaussian kernel is unique in that it assigns positive weight to observations outside of the bandwidth.
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columns include a full set of additional covariates while the odd columns do not. The results for
the polynomial specification are quite similar in magnitude to those for the non-parametric speci-
fication (0.1090 for initial treatment villages and 0.0504 for delayed-treatment villages), although
the polynomial results are less precisely estimated. Adding covariates does not make a noticeable
difference, and higher order polynomials have only a small impact.
Table 3.8: Polynomial Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial-Treatment 0.0829*** 0.0862** 0.0873*** 0.0837*** 0.0959*** 0.0945**
Village (0.0219) (0.0204) (0.0224) (0.0210) (0.0256) (0.0234)
Delayed-Treatment 0.052* 0.052* 0.053* 0.053* 0.062* 0.060*
Village (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
Polynomial Degree 1 1 2 2 3 3
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Data includes all individuals ages 12-16 in 1999, who have completed primary school. Non-parametric results
are 0.1090 for initial treatment villages and 0.0504 for delayed-treatment villages. Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effect of Progresa, a conditional cash transfer program in rural Mexico, on
school enrollment. In contrast to randomized evaluations, I use a regression discontinuity design
and estimate the effect of Progresa at its eligibility cutoff. I focus on the effect of Progresa on
children in delayed-treatment villages and find that Progresa eligibility increased the probability
of enrollment by 0.05 in the year prior to the initiation of cash grants. This effect is robust to using
a non-parametric or parametric specifications as well as to the choice of kernel and bandwidth in
the non-parametric case and the specific functional form in the parametric case.
While this result is surprising in a traditional treatment and control framework, the fact that
delayed-treatment villages do receive cash transfers at a later date offers an explanation. The ex-
pectation of cash transfers in the future represents a decrease in the long-run cost of schooling.
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Sufficiently forward-looking households respond to that change, with the result of increased en-
rollment.
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Chapter 4
The Effect of College Type on Income
4.1 Introduction
Undergraduate degree programs in the United States differ in many ways. Some differences are
easily observable, such as class size, admissions selectivity, and racial composition of the student
body. Others, such as faculty availability, academic culture, and multicultural engagement may be
difficult to measure or even to define.1 Any of these differences could plausibly effect the kind and
quality of education that undergraduates receive, which in turn may impact future wages.
Instead of attempting to estimate the return to different college characteristics, I rely on well
known existing classifications of type by the Carnegie Foundation. These classifications are pri-
marily based on the level and distribution of degrees awarded. However, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that they also reflect other many other characteristics as well.2 I also examine how the differ-
ential return to college type varies over the career cycle. If different types of colleges provide their
graduates with different skills, some may result in wage returns earlier than others. For example,
some college types may provide skills that are useful to obtaining an entry level position, while
1Numerous other differences exist as well, to name just a few: public or private control; residential or commuter
campus; faculty credentials, experience, teaching load, and research activities; reliance on graduate students for teach-
ing undergraduate courses; major and general education requirements; weather.
2For example, liberal arts colleges are widely seen as having small class sizes, smaller student bodies and high
levels of student faculty interaction. In contrast, research universities are view as having large introductory courses, a
reliance on graduate teaching assistants for teaching many classes and low faculty teaching loads.
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others may provide skills useful for advancing within a firm.
I find that college type is most relevant for institutions that focus on baccalaureate education.
Graduates of traditional liberal arts colleges have similar incomes to graduates of other types dur-
ing the first ten years, but have higher incomes later in their careers, with as much as a 25 percent
premium. In contrast, graduates of baccalaureate colleges with a professional focus earn roughly
twenty percent less than graduates of other colleges, while graduates of research I universities earn
roughly ten percent more. I use two separate statistical approaches: a regression model that con-
trols for a rich set of pre-college characteristics and a propensities score matching method. Results
are similar in each approach.
4.2 Data
The data used in this paper comes from two sources: survey data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and college classification data from the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching. The NLSY79 is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of
12,682 individuals born between 1957 and 1964. The first round of the survey was in 1979 when
respondents were between fourteen and twenty-two years old. The survey was conducted annually
from 1979-1983 and biennially from 1984 onwards. It includes a wide range of questions on labor
market behavior, income, educational experiences, family background, health and the score on the
Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), a test of basic skills given to potential military recruits.
I use the confidential version of the data, which includes information on college and geographic
location.
To classify colleges and universities by type, I use classification data from the Carnegie Foun-
dation for the Advancement of Teaching, an independent policy and research center dedicated to
improving teaching and learning. The Carnegie Foundation is well known for its classification sys-
tem that “groups American colleges and universities on the basis of their missions and educational
functions.” The Carnegie classifications are “not intended to establish a hierarchy among higher
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learning institutions. Rather, the aim is to group institutions according to their shared character-
istics.” (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1987 p. 1-2) The classifications
were first introduced in 1976 and have been updated periodically. I use the 1986 version. The
NLSY79 and Carnegie classification data are linked using Federal Interagency Committee on Ed-
ucation (FICE) codes.
I restrict my sample to individuals that have obtained a bachelor’s degree and who report the
college they graduated from. Of the 12,682 respondents, 1902 earned a bachelors degree. Of those,
122 either did not report the college from which they obtained their bachelor’s degree, or reported
a FICE code that did not correspond to a four-year institution in the Carnegie classifications and
as a result were excluded, resulting in a sample size of 1781 individuals.
Table 4.1 tabulates individuals by the type of college from which they obtained their first bach-
elors degree. Classifications are primarily based on the amount of degrees awarded at various
levels. Research and doctoral universities award degrees through the doctorate, master’s univer-
sities award through master’s degree and baccalaureate Colleges award primarily baccalaureate
degrees. Research universities also receive substantial federal grant funding. Specialized schools
award the majority of their degrees in a single discipline. Roman numerals indicate the breadth of
programs. For example, institutions classified as doctoral universities I award at least 40 doctoral
degrees annually in five or more disciplines, while those classified as doctoral universities II award
fewer. Baccalaureate I colleges award at least 40 percent or more of their degrees in liberal arts
fields (these are the traditional liberal arts colleges), while baccalaureate II colleges award degrees
primarily in professional fiends. Full definitions of college classifications are given in table 4.2.
The most common type is master’s I with over one-third of individuals graduating for this type of
institution.
Table 4.2 gives means of selected demographic characteristics by type. Graduates of different
types of institutions differ markedly. Students who graduate from Baccalaureate or Master’s insti-
tutions are more likely to be female; those graduating from Research and Doctoral I institutions
are more likely to be male. Baccalaureate I and II colleges are similar in gender composition, but
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Table 4.1: Number of Graduates in the NLSY79 by Type
Carnegie Classification Count Relative Frequency
Master’s Universities I 606 34.03%
Master’s Universities II 113 6.34%
Doctoral Universities I 127 7.13%
Doctoral Universities II 95 5.33%
Baccalaureate (Liberal Arts) Colleges I 74 4.15%
Baccalaureate Colleges II 141 7.92%
Research Universities I 338 4.44%
Research Universities II 208 18.98%
Specialized 79 11.68%
Total 1,781 100%
Tabulation of bachelor’s degree granting college for all individuals in the NLSY79
that reported obtaining at bachelor’s degree or higher.
differ substantially in other characteristics. Only 5 percent of baccalaureate I graduates are black
(the least of any type) while over 30 percent of baccalaureate II graduates are black (the most of
any type). Graduates of baccalaureate I colleges also have the highest level of mother’s education,
have the fewest number of siblings, and score the highest on the AFQT, while baccalaureate II
college are on the opposite extreme. The differences between the I and II level for other types is
less extreme. Baccalaureate I college graduates are similar to research I graduates in most areas,
but have very different gender compositions.
4.3 Regression Results
I estimate the following specification
log(yi) = α+
∑
j
βjTypeji + γExpi + δX
pre−college
i + i (4.1)
Where yi is real income, Type
j
i is an indicator variable taking the value one if individual i
obtained their first bachelors degree from a type j school, Expi is years of potential post-college
workforce experience,3 and Xpre−collegei is a vector of pre-college characteristics.
3Defined as current year minus the year of first bachelor’s degree.
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Table 4.3: Demographic Characteristics by College Type
Female Black Mother’s Number of AFQT Foreign
Education Siblings Language
Master’s I 0.60 0.20 12.31 3.08 63.45 0.19
(0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.94) (0.02)
Master’s II 0.57 0.27 12.57 2.91 61.34 0.15
(0.05) (0.04) (0.26) (0.19) (2.19) (0.04)
Doctoral I 0.57 0.13 13.32 3.08 71.48 0.19
(0.04) (0.03) (0.25) (0.18) (2.08) (0.03)
Doctoral II 0.50 0.12 12.60 2.83 68.22 0.20
(0.05) (0.04) (0.29) (0.21) (2.38) (0.04)
Baccalaureate I 0.55 0.05 14.32 2.26 79.99 0.08
(0.06) (0.04) (0.33) (0.24) (2.72) (0.04)
Baccalaureate II 0.53 0.31 12.50 2.92 62.45 0.06
(0.04) (0.03) (0.24) (0.17) (1.98) (0.03)
Research I 0.44 0.12 13.32 2.55 78.71 0.22
(0.03) (0.02) (0.15) (0.11) (1.27) (0.02)
Research II 0.47 0.16 13.55 2.43 75.00 0.16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.2) (0.14) (1.61) (0.03)
Specialized 0.43 0.18 12.12 2.92 63.45 0.20
(0.06) (0.04) (0.31) (0.23) (2.61) (0.04)
Omitted college type is master’s I. No additional explainatory variables are included except expe-
rience. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.3 gives results for OLS estimation of equation 4.1 without any covariates. In order to
examine how the return to college type varies over the course of an individual’s career, I group
my sample by years of potential post-bachelor’s degree experience and estimate equation 4.1 sep-
arately for each group. The omitted college type is master’s I, so the interpretation of each coef-
ficient is percent increase (decrease) in income for an individual who attends a given college type
relative to someone who graduated from a master’s I institution (one third of my sample are mas-
ter’s I graduates). Given the demographic differences between graduates of different types, these
should not be given a causal interpretation. Rather, they describe the differences in income across
college type, without consideration of selection effects.4
Several college types show a pattern to the changes in their return. Research I, research II, bac-
calaureate I and specialized graduates have their incomes relative to master’s I graduates increase
with experience. Baccalaureate I earn the same amount as master’s I graduates during the first ten
years of their career, but earn between 19 and 31 percent higher later on. Graduates of baccalaure-
ate II colleges earn substantially less than master’s I graduates in all experience levels. Master’s II
graduates also earn less, although the difference is not statistically significant between eleven and
twenty years of experience. In general, the differences in log incomes track with skill as measured
by AFQT scores. College types with high AFQT scores have graduates that earn more, and the
difference tends to increase over time.
Table 4.3 gives OLS estimates for equation 4.1 with a full set of pre-college covariates, includ-
ing gender, race, highest grade completed by mother, highest grade complete by father, rural/urban
location and AFQT score. For most types, the inclusion of pre-college covariates has little impact.
Relative to master’s I graduate, baccalaureate II graduates still earn substantially less, and the gap
widens with higher levels of experience. Graduates of baccalaureate I colleges have similar earn-
ing to graduates of master’s I universities, but earn 12 percent more with eleven to fifteen years
of experience, twenty-five percent more with sixteen to twenty years experience and twenty-two
4The declining sample sizes are a result of several factors. The largest is the change from an annual survey to a
biennial survey in 1994 (median experience in 1994 was 12 years). Additional contributing factors are individuals
leaving the workforce and sample attrition.
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Table 4.4: Log Earnings by College Type Over Time
Years of experience 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 20 to 25
Master’s II -0.13** -0.21*** -0.08 -0.11 -0.22***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Doctoral I 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.14* -0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Doctoral II 0.09 0.15*** -0.04 -0.06 -0.04
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Baccalaureate I 0.02 0.05 0.15* 0.25*** 0.22**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Baccalaureate II -0.16*** -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.29***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Specialized -0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Research I 0.07 0.07** 0.05 0.10* 0.12**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Research II -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15
Observations 7835 7404 4528 2877 2596
Omitted college type is master’s I. No additional explainatory variables are included except
experience. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
percent more with twenty-one to twenty-five years of experience. For research universities, the
inclusion of demographic does matter. Research II graduates do not receive a premium, and for
research I graduates the premium is less (roughly ten percent) and does not increase over time.
A concern in giving the estimates in table 4.3 a causal interpretation, is that there may be
unobserved variables that are correlated both with college type and earnings, which would result
in biased estimates. In the literature on the return to schooling, these potential unobserved variables
are often referred to as “ability.” It may be that these results reflect sorting of high (or low) ability
students into different types of schools. Mitigating this concern to a degree is the inclusion of
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Table 4.5: Specifications with Pre-College Characteristics
Years of experience 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 20 to 25
Master’s II -0.13** -0.21*** -0.08 -0.11 -0.22***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Doctoral I 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.14* -0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Doctoral II 0.09 0.15*** -0.04 -0.06 -0.04
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Baccalaureate I 0.02 0.05 0.15* 0.25*** 0.22**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Baccalaureate II -0.16*** -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.29***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Specialized -0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Research I 0.07 0.07** 0.05 0.10* 0.12**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Research II -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15
Observations 7835 7404 4528 2877 2596
Omitted college type is master’s I. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
AFQT scores as an explanatory variable. AFQT scores are generally held to be a good measure
of pre-college ability. Neal and Johnson (1996) found that including AFQT scores explained the
observed black-white wage gap for young women and three-quarters of the black-white wage gap
for men, reflecting a skills gap measure by AFQT scores. This suggests that using the AFQT
may capture much of the ability differences between graduates of different types. However, there
remains the possibility that there may remain other unobserved characteristics that bias the OLS
estimates.
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4.4 Matching Results
In an effort to reduce any bias resulting from the selection issue, I use propensity score matching
approach, first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Propensity score matching is a quasi-
experimental approach based on comparing treatment and control individuals who are a similar
as possible. I examine each college type in turn and consider graduating from a college of the
given type to be the “treatment.” The propensity score is the probability of receiving “treatment,”
conditional on pre-treatment characteristics. Propensity score matching has been used by Fryer and
Greenstone (2007) to estimate the effect of attending a Historically Black College or University
and by Brand and Halaby (2006) to estimate the effect of attending an elite (selective) college.
I use the following process to estimate propensity scores. First, I estimate the probit model:
Pr(Typei = 1|Xi) = Φ(X ′β) (4.2)
using maximum likelihood. Here Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard nor-
mal distribution, and X are pre-college characteristics including gender, age, race, highest grade
obtained by father and mother, frequency of religious attendance at age 14, and AFQT score. I
then divide the sample into quintiles based on the propensity score. Within each quintile, I test
for the the average propensity scores for “treated” and “control” equal. If the null hypothesis of
equality is rejected in a given quintile, I form two new blocks by dividing the initial quintile in half
and performing the test again, continuing until the average propensity scores do not differ. I then
test whether the means of each covariate are equal in each block. If that test fails for any covariate,
I re-estimate 4.2 with additional interactions of the covariates. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) provide
formal details of estimating the propensity score, as well as requirements for its validity.
Table 4.4 lists estimates for the return to college type using stratified matching. In stratified
matching, I compare average log real income within each balanced propensity score block. I take a
weighted average (by the number of treated observations) of the block effects to obtain the average
treatment effect.
62
Table 4.6: Matching Estimates of the Return to College Type
Experience 1 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25
Master’s I 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Master’s II -0.08 -0.17*** -0.06 -0.16*** -0.25***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Doctoral I 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.15* -0.08
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Doctoral II 0.12 0.19*** -0.01 -0.03 0.03
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
Baccalaureate I 0.00 0.03 0.12* 0.23*** 0.25**
(0.07) (0.05 ) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Baccalaureate II -0.206*** -0.225*** -0.23*** -0.285*** -0.29***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Research I 0.121*** 0.093*** 0.075** 0.11** 0.176***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Research II -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Specialized -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.11
(0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08)
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results in table 4.4 estimate the return a given college type, relative to all other types. As
a result, they cannot be directly compared to the regression results found in table 4.3, which are
relative to master’s I graduates. However, since the results shown in 4.4 indicate that the return to
graduating from a master’s I university, relative to all others is quite small (at most four percent),
so a rough comparison can be made. Results are generally quite similar. Research I graduates
earn about ten percent more than graduates of other types, and the effect is relatively stable with
increased experience. Baccalaureate II graduates earn twenty percent less at the beginning of
their careers, and the effect is larger with more experience. Graduating from a Baccalaureate I
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College has no effect during the first ten years of an individuals career, but it has a large effect with
higher levels of experience, with graduates with 20-24 years of experience earning 25% more than
graduates of other types.
Stratified matching is one of several methods that can be used to match based on the propen-
sity score. Table 4.4 lists results for two alternative matching estimators using graduating from
a baccalaureate I college as the treatment. The first two columns are provided for comparison
purposes: column one gives results for an OLS regression of log real income on an indicator for
graduating from a baccalaureate I college and precollege characteristics.5 Column two presents
the stratified matching results found in table 4.4. Column 3 uses a nearest-neighbor matching es-
timator. Each treated individual who graduated from a baccalaureate I college is matched to the
graduate of another type of college with the closest propensity score. The average treatment effect
is then the average of the differences between matched pairs. Column 4 uses a kernel matching es-
timator. Each baccalaureate I College graduate is compared to a weighted average of graduates of
other types, with the weights given by a Gaussian kernel.6 Results for nearest-neighbor and kernel
matching estimators are quite similar to both the stratified matching estimator and OLS regression
results. For a given experience band, results for all estimators are within one standard error of each
other. In most cases the results are even closer.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the differential return to college types as defined by the Carnegie Classifica-
tions. Regression and matching estimators consistently indicate that their is a substantial income
premium to graduates of research I universities (roughly ten percent) as well as a premium to grad-
uates baccalaureate I colleges that grows from zero in the initial part of their career to as large as
twenty-five percent to experienced workers. Baccalaureate II college graduates have much lower
5The OLS results presented here are different from those found in table 4.3 in that they only include a single type.
This allows for direct comparison to the matching results.
6Standard errors for the kernel matching are found using 500 bootstrap replications. Analytical standard errors are
used for other estimators.
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Table 4.7: Alternative Matching Estimators - Baccalaureate I
OLS Stratified Nearest Neighbor Kernel
0 to 4 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07)
5 to 9 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
10 to 14 0.16** 0.12* 0.13 0.14**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07)
15 to 19 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.23* 0.24***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08)
20 to 24 0.23** 0.25** 0.16 0.21*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
Each estimate is the return to the given college type, relative to all others.
See appendix for college type definitions. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
earnings - twenty to twenty-nine percent less than other college graduates. The higher returns two
the two most selective college types (research I and baccalaureate I) is consistent with the existing
literature on college quality that finds higher returns for selective colleges (among others, Kane
(1998); Brewer et al. (1999); Brand and Halaby (2006))7 Furthermore, the increasing return found
for baccalaureate I colleges is similar to the result found by Brand and Halaby (2006) that elite
colleges have a larger impact on late career earnings. There remains much work to be done in
understanding the reasons for differential returns to college types. The higher returns to research I
and baccalaureate I degrees may be the result of factors that can be emulated by other types.
7It should be noted that DaleKrueger find no additional return for elite colleges.
65
References
Allen, R. P. (1992). Social factors associated with the amount of school week sleep lag for seniors
in an early starting suburban high school. Sleep Research, 114.
Baroni, E., K. Naku, N. Spaulding, M. Gavin, M. Finalborgo, M. K. LeBourgeois, and A. R.
Wolfson (2004). Sleep habits and daytime functioning in students attending early versus late
starting middle schools. Sleep, A396–A397.
Barro, R. J. (2001). Human capital and growth. The American Economic Review 91(2), pp. 12–17.
Brand, J. E. and C. N. Halaby (2006). Regression and matching estimates of the effects of elite
college attendance on educational and career achievement. Social Science Research 35(3), 749
– 770.
Brewer, D. J., E. R. Eide, and R. G. Ehrenberg (1999). Does it pay to attend an elite private
college?. Journal of Human Resources 34(1), 104 – 123.
Canay, I. A. (2010, May). A note on quantile regression for panel data models. Working paper.
Card, D. (1999). The causal effect of education on earnings. Handbook of labor economics 3,
1801–1863.
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1987). A classification of institutions of
higher education. Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
Carrell, S. E., T. Maghakian, and J. E. West (2010). A’s from zzzz’s? The causal effect of school
start time on the academic achievement of adolescents. Working Paper.
Cheng, M.-Y., J. Fan, and J. S. Marron (1997). On automatic boundary corrections. Annals of
Statistics 25, 1691–1708.
Dahl, R. E. and D. S. Lewin (2002). Pathways to adolescent health sleep regulation and behavior.
Journal of Adolescent Health 31(6, Supplement 1), 175 – 184.
Danner, F. and B. Phillips (2008). Adolescent sleep, school start times, and teen motor vehicle
crashes. Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine 4(6), 533–535.
Dehejia, R. H. and S. Wahba (2002). Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental
causal studies. The Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1), pp. 151–161.
66
di Giovanni, J. and A. Matsumoto (2011). The value of human capital wealth. Global COE Hi-Stat
Discussion Paper Series.
Fryer, R. G. and M. Greenstone (2007). The causes and consequences of attending historically
black colleges and universities. Working Paper 13036, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Fugenschuh, A. (2009). Solving a school bus scheduling problem with integer programming.
European Journal of Operational Research 193, 867–884.
Han, J., P. Todd, and W. van der Klaaw (2001). Identification and estimation of treatment effects
with a regression-discontinuity design. Econometrica 69, 201–09.
Hinrichs, P. (2010, July). When the bell tolls: The effects of school starting times on academic
achievement. Working paper.
Imbens, G. and K. Kalyanaraman (2009, February). Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression
discontinuity estimator. Working Paper 14726, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Imbens, G. W. and T. Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice.
Journal of Econometrics 142(2), 615 – 635.
Instituto Nacional de Salud Pu´blica (2005, November). General Rural Methodology Note. Instituto
Nacional de Salud Pu´blica.
Kalish, N. (2008, Jan. 14). Early bird gets the bad grade. New York Times.
Kane, T. (1998). Racial and ethnic preferences in college admission. In C. Jencks and M. Phillips
(Eds.), The Black-White Test Score Gap. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
Keller, H. and W. Muller (1979). Optimierung des schulerverkehrs durch gemischt ganzzahlige
programmierung. Zeitschrift fur Operations Research B 23, 105–122. (in German).
Koenker, R. (2005). Quantile Regression. Cambridge University Press.
Krueger, A. B. (1999). Experimental estimates of education production functions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114, 497–532.
McMahon, C. (2007, May 29). NYC program will try to buy good parenting. Chicago Tribune.
Meijer, A. M., H. T. Habekothe, and G. L. Van Den Wittenboer (2000). Time in bed , quality of
sleep and school functioning of children. Journal of Sleep Research 9(2), 145–153.
Neal, D. A. and W. R. Johnson (1996). The role of premarket factors in black-white wage differ-
ences. Journal of Political Economy 104(5), 869.
Parker, S. and E. Skoufias (2000). The impact of progresa on work, leisure and time allocation:
Final report. Technical report, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Pilcher, J. J. and A. J. Huffcutt (1996). Effects of sleep deprivation on performance: A meta-
analysis. Sleep: Journal of Sleep Research & Sleep Medicine 19(4), 318–326.
67
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational
studies for causal effects. Biometrika 70(1), pp. 41–55.
Schultz, T. P. (2004). School subsidies for the poor: Evaluating a mexican strategy for reducing
poverty. Journal of Development Economics 74, 199–250.
Skoufias, E. and B. McClafferty (2001). Is PROGRESA working? Summary of the results of an
evaluation by IFPRI. Technical report, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Todd, P. and K.Wolpin (2006). Assessing the impact of a school subsidy program in mexico: Using
a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child schooling and fertility.
American Economic Review 96(5), 1384–1417.
Trudeau, M. (2007, Jan 18). High schools starting later to help sleepy teens. Morning Edition.
Wahlstrom, K. (2000). Changing start times: Findings from the first longitudinal study of later
high school start times. NASSP Bulletin 86(633), 3–21.
Wake County Public School System Department of Transportation (2004, Winter). The three-tier
bus transportation system. Wheels of Education..
Wolfson, A. and M. Carskadon (2003). Understanding adolescents’ sleep patterns and school
performance: A critical appraisal. Sleep medicine Reviews 7(6), 491–506.
Wolfson, A. and M. Carskadon (2005). A survey of factors affecting high school start times.
NASSP Bulletin 89(642), 47–66.
Wolfson, A. R., N. L. Spaulding, C. Dandrow, and E. M. Baroni (2007). Middle school start times:
The importance of a good night’s sleep for young adolescents. Behavioral Sleep Medicine 5(3),
194 – 209.
Wong, J. (2011, January). Does school start too early for student learning? Working paper.
68
